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Consistency and the Relative Adjustment Principle
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Abstract
This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
by adequately generalizing and analyzing properties for bankruptcy rules. In particular,
we discuss several consistency notions and introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy
rules. Moreover, we introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules and study the
relative adjustment principle based on relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and
minimal rights first.
Keywords: NTU-bankruptcy problem, axiomatic analysis, consistency, parametric
bankruptcy rules, adjusted bankruptcy rules, relative adjustment principle
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1 Introduction
A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility, shortly an NTU-bankruptcy problem,
arises when a set of claimants have individual and incompatible claims on a divisible and
deficient bundle of resources which generate utility. The corresponding set of induced utility
allocations constitutes the estate of the bankruptcy problem and bankruptcy rules assign
to each such a bankruptcy problem a feasible utility allocation. NTU-bankruptcy problems
form a natural generalization of TU-bankruptcy problems where the assumption of linear and
transferable utility is dropped. TU-bankruptcy problems are well-studied in the literature
(cf. Thomson (2003), Thomson (2013), and Thomson (2015)) and the question arises whether
and how bankruptcy theory can be extended to NTU-bankruptcy problems. However, this
passage is in general fraught with difficulties.
Orshan, Valenciano, and Zarzuelo (2003), Estévez-Fernández, Borm, and Fiestras-Janeiro
(2014), and Dietzenbacher (2017) studied NTU-bankruptcy problems from a game theoretic
perspective by defining an appropriate coalitional bankruptcy game and focusing on the
structure of the core. Instead, we continue on the axiomatic approach of Dietzenbacher,
Estévez-Fernández, Borm, and Hendrickx (2016) by formulating some appropriate properties
for bankruptcy rules and studying their implications.
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Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) explored proportionality, equality, and duality in the context
of NTU-bankruptcy problems and introduced the proportional rule, the constrained relative
equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule. They extended axiomatic
characterizations by adequately generalizing the corresponding properties for TU-bankruptcy
rules to NTU-bankruptcy rules. In particular, they defined the relative symmetry property
which imposes a relatively equal treatment of claimants with relatively equal claims, i.e.
equal claims in relation to their utopia values. Moreover, they defined the property of
truncation invariance, which imposes invariance of the prescribed allocation under truncation
of the claims by the utopia values.
A well-studied rule for bankruptcy problems with transferable utility is the so-called
Talmud rule. Aumann and Maschler (1985) showed that the Talmud rule is the unique
TU-bankruptcy rule satisfying consistency and the contested garment principle. This paper
studies generalizations of these two concepts to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable
utility. The question whether there also exists a unique NTU-bankruptcy rule satisfying
both generalized properties is not addressed here, but is of interest for future research.
Consistency requires that application of a bankruptcy rule to a subproblem leads to
the same payoffs for the involved claimants as within the original bankruptcy problem.
We examine the relation of the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards
rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule with several consistency notions and
introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy rules. However, the design of subproblems of
NTU-bankruptcy problems is not straightforward or trivial, and it turns out that different
modeling choices have different consequences.
The contested garment principle for TU-bankruptcy rules describes a standard solution
for bankruptcy problems with two claimants where they first concede the minimal rights to
each other and subsequently divide the remaining estate equally. There, the minimal right
of a claimant (cf. Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987)) is defined as the maximal payoff within
the estate when all other claimants are allocated their claims. To adequately generalize this
two-claimant procedure to the new relative adjustment principle for NTU-bankruptcy rules,
we define the minimal rights first property and introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy
rules.
The minimal rights first property requires that application of a bankruptcy rule to the
remaining bankruptcy problem when all claimants are first allocated their minimal rights
leads to the same payoff allocation as the original bankruptcy problem. It turns out that the
proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative
equal losses rule do not satisfy minimal rights first. Inspired by Thomson and Yeh (2008),
we introduce the truncation operator and minimal rights operator which ‘force’ bankruptcy
rules to satisfy truncation invariance and minimal rights first, respectively. All bankruptcy
rules that result from applying these operators to relative symmetric bankruptcy rules satisfy
the relative adjustment principle.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we provide an overview of
NTU-bankruptcy theory based on Dietzenbacher et al. (2016). Section 3 discusses several
consistency notions and introduces the class of parametric bankruptcy rules. In Section




Let N be a nonempty and finite set of claimants. The collection of all subsets of N is denoted
by 2N = {S | S ⊆ N}. For any set of payoff allocations E ⊆ RN+ ,
– the comprehensive hull is given by comp(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ∃y∈E : y ≥ x};
– the weak upper contour set is given by WUC(E) = {x ∈ RN+ | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the weak Pareto set is given by WP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};
– the strong Pareto set is given by SP(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E,y 6=x : y ≥ x}.
Note that SP(E) ⊆ WP(E) ⊆ WUC(E). A set of payoff allocations E ⊆ RN+ is called
comprehensive if E = comp(E), and nonleveled if SP(E) = WP(E).
A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016)) is
a triple (N,E, c) in which E ⊆ RN+ is a nonempty, closed, bounded, comprehensive, and
nonleveled estate, and c ∈ WUC(E) is a vector of claims. Let BRN denote the class of all
bankruptcy problems with claimant set N . For convenience, an NTU-bankruptcy problem
is denoted by (E, c) ∈ BRN .
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . The vector of utopia values uE ∈ RN+ is given by
uE = (max{xi | x ∈ E})i∈N .






Note that (E, ĉE) ∈ BRN .
Example 1.
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in which E = {x ∈ RN+ |
x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24). We have uE = (6, 18) and ĉE = (3, 18).
E
c







A bankruptcy rule f on BRN assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff allocation f(E, c) ∈
WP(E) for which f(E, c) ≤ c. A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies
– relative symmetry if fi(E, c)u
E
j = fj(E, c)u
E
i for all (E, c) ∈ BR






– truncation invariance if f(E, c) = f(E, ĉE) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
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The proportional rule Prop on BRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016)) assigns to any
(E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
Prop(E, c) = λE,cc,
where λE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c) ∈WP(E). The proportional rule satisfies relative
symmetry, but does not satisfy truncation invariance.
The constrained relative equal awards rule CREA on BRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al.






where αE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c) ∈ WP(E). The constrained relative equal
awards rule satisfies both relative symmetry and truncation invariance.
The constrained relative equal losses rule CREL on BRN (cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016))
assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN with E 6= {0N} the payoff allocation
CREL(E, c) =
(
max{0, ci − βE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where βE,c ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c) ∈ WP(E). The constrained relative equal losses
rule satisfies relative symmetry, but does not satisfy truncation invariance.
Example 2.
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in which E = {x ∈
RN+ | x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1. We have λE,c = 23 , α
E,c = 34 ,
and βE,c = 1 − 16
√
15. This means that Prop(E, c) = (2, 16), CREA(E, c) = (3, 13 12 ), and

















In this section, we discuss several consistency notions and introduce the class of parametric
bankruptcy rules. Following Thomson (2011), the consistency principle can be stated as
follows. Consider a bankruptcy problem and the corresponding payoff allocation assigned
by a particular bankruptcy rule. Suppose that some claimants leave with their allocated
payoffs and that the remaining claimants reevaluate their allocated payoffs by examining
the induced subproblem. The bankruptcy rule is called consistent if it prescribes for this
subproblem the same payoffs for the involved claimants.
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For TU-bankruptcy problems, the estate of such a subproblem can simply be defined as
the original estate subtracted with the allocated payoffs to the leaving claimants (cf. Aumann
and Maschler (1985)). For NTU-bankruptcy problems, the design of such a subproblem is
not straightforward or trivial. We discuss several ways to generalize the consistency property
for TU-bankruptcy rules. In any case, we need to enlarge the domain of bankruptcy rules.
A natural option is to convert the induced subproblem into a new bankruptcy problem for
the remaining claimants in which the estate is defined as the part of the original estate where
all leaving claimants are allocated their corresponding payoffs. For this, we need to extend the
domain of bankruptcy rules to bankruptcy problems for any nonempty subset of claimants.
Formally, a bankruptcy rule f on BR =
⋃
S∈2N\{∅} BR
S assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRS with
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} a payoff allocation f(E, c) ∈WP(E) for which f(E, c) ≤ c.
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN , let x ∈ RN+ , and let S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. The set of payoff allocations
ExS ⊆ RS+ is given by
ExS = {y ∈ RS+ | (y, xN\S) ∈ E}.
Note that (E
f(E,c)
S , cS) ∈ BR
S for any bankruptcy rule f on BRN .
Definition 3.1 (Strong Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on BR satisfies strong consistency if fS(E, c) = f(E
f(E,c)
S , cS) for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
The weaker property where only subproblems for two remaining claimants are considered
is called bilateral consistency.
Definition 3.2 (Bilateral Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on BR satisfies bilateral consistency if fS(E, c) = f(E
f(E,c)
S , cS) for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2.
In other words, a bankruptcy rule is bilaterally consistent if it assigns to each two-claimant
subproblem the same payoffs for the remaining claimants as within the original bankruptcy
problem. This principle can also be applied in reverse direction. Consider a bankruptcy
problem and a corresponding feasible payoff allocation. Suppose that for each two-claimant
subproblem a bankruptcy rule prescribes the corresponding payoffs within this allocation.
Then the bankruptcy rule is called conversely consistent (cf. Thomson (2011)) if it assigns
this payoff allocation to the original bankruptcy problem.
Definition 3.3 (Converse Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on BR satisfies converse consistency if f(E, c) = x for all (E, c) ∈ BRN
and any x ∈WP(E) with x ≤ c for which xS = f(ExS , cS) for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2.
If a bilateral consistent bankruptcy rule coincides with a conversely consistent bankruptcy
rule on the class of two-claimant bankruptcy problems, then the rules coincide for any
bankruptcy problem. This type of result is known as an elevator lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Elevator Lemma).
Let f and g be two bankruptcy rules on BR. If f satisfies bilateral consistency, g satisfies
converse consistency, and f(E, c) = g(E, c) for all (E, c) ∈ BRS with S ∈ 2N and |S| = 2,
then f = g.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let x = f(E, c). Since f satisfies bilateral consistency, we have
xS = f(E
x
S , cS) for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2. This means that xS = g(ExS , cS) for all S ∈ 2N
with |S| = 2. Since g satisfies converse consistency, this implies that g(E, c) = x. Hence,
f(E, c) = g(E, c).
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For a bankruptcy rule which satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency,
the Elevator Lemma can be used to extend axiomatic characterizations from bankruptcy
problems with two claimants to arbitrary populations. An example of such a bankruptcy
rule is the proportional rule.
Lemma 3.2.
The proportional rule satisfies strong consistency.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. We have PropS(E, c) = λE,ccS and
Prop(E
Prop(E,c)




where λE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c) ∈WP(E) and λE
Prop(E,c)
S ,cS ∈ [0, 1] is such that
Prop(E
Prop(E,c)
S , cS) ∈WP(E
Prop(E,c)
S ).
Since PropS(E, c) ∈ E
Prop(E,c)
S , we have PropS(E, c) ≤ Prop(E
Prop(E,c)




S , cS),PropN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that PropS(E, c) = Prop(E
Prop(E,c)
S , cS). Hence, the proportional rule satisfies
strong consistency.
Lemma 3.3.
The proportional rule satisfies converse consistency.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let x ∈ WP(E) with x ≤ c be such that xS = Prop(ExS , cS)
for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2. We have Prop(E, c) = λE,cc. Moreover, we have xS = λE
x
S ,cScS
for all S ∈ 2N with |S| = 2, which means that x = tc for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Since E is
nonleveled, this means that Prop(E, c) = x. Hence, the proportional rule satisfies converse
consistency.
Theorem 3.4.
Any axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule for two-claimant bankruptcy problems
yields an axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule for any bankruptcy problem if
either bilateral consistency or converse consistency is required in addition.1
Proof. We know from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 that the proportional rule satisfies bilateral
consistency and converse consistency. Let f be a bankruptcy rule on BR satisfying the
properties in the axiomatic characterization of the proportional rule on the class of two-
claimant bankruptcy problems and either bilateral consistency or converse consistency. Then,
we have f(E, c) = Prop(E, c) for all (E, c) ∈ BRS with S ∈ 2N and |S| = 2. Since
the proportional rule satisfies bilateral consistency and converse consistency, we know from
Lemma 3.1 that f = Prop.
In particular, we can derive new characterizations of the proportional rule from the work
of Dietzenbacher et al. (2016) using Theorem 3.4, by requiring the corresponding properties
in the axiomatic characterizations for the class of two-claimant bankruptcy problems and
adding bilateral or converse consistency.
1This type of theorem can be formulated for any bankruptcy rule satisfying bilateral consistency and
converse consistency.
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Contrary to the class of TU-bankruptcy problems, the constrained relative equal awards
rule and the constrained relative equal losses rule do not satisfy strong consistency on the
class of NTU-bankruptcy problems. A possible way out is to restrict strong consistency to
the subproblems for which the ratio of the utopia values is equal to the ratio in the original
bankruptcy problem.
Definition 3.4 (Restricted Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on BR satisfies restricted consistency if fS(E, c) = f(E
f(E,c)
S , cS) for
all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N \ {∅} for which uE
f(E,c)
S = tuES for some t ∈ [0, 1].
O’Neill (1982) described bankruptcy rules which are independent of claimants with zero
claims, i.e., bankruptcy rules which are consistent with respect to subproblems where only
claimants with zero claims leave. Following Thomson (2003), we call this property limited
consistency.
Definition 3.5 (Limited Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on BR satisfies limited consistency if fS(E, c) = f(E
f(E,c)
S , cS) for all
(E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N \ {∅} for which cN\S = 0N\S .
Note that both strong consistency and restricted consistency generalize the consistency
notion for TU-bankruptcy rules. Moreover, strong consistency is stronger than restricted
consistency, which in turn is stronger than limited consistency.
Proposition 3.5.
The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies restricted consistency.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈ 2N \ {∅} be such that uE
CREA(E,c)
S = tuES for some
t ∈ [0, 1]. We have CREAi(E, c) = min{ci, αE,cuEi } for all i ∈ S and
CREA(E
CREA(E,c)










S ,cSuEi })i∈S ,
where αE,c ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c) ∈WP(E) and αE
CREA(E,c)
S ,cS ∈ [0, 1] is such that
CREA(E
CREA(E,c)
S , cS) ∈WP(E
CREA(E,c)
S ).
Since CREAS(E, c) ∈ ECREA(E,c)S , we have CREAS(E, c) ≤ CREAS(E
CREA(E,c)
S , cS). Since
E is nonleveled and (
CREA(E
CREA(E,c)
S , cS),CREAN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that CREAS(E, c) = CREA(E
CREA(E,c)
S , cS). Hence, the constrained relative
equal awards rule satisfies restricted consistency.
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Proposition 3.6.
The constrained relative equal losses rule satisfies restricted consistency.
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN with E 6= {0N} and let S ∈ 2N \{∅} be such that uE
CREL(E,c)
S = tuES
for some t ∈ [0, 1]. We have CRELi(E, c) = max{0, ci − βE,cuEi } for all i ∈ S and
CREL(E
CREL(E,c)








= (max{0, ci − tβE
CREL(E,c)
S ,cSuEi })i∈S ,
where βE,c ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c) ∈WP(E) and βE
CREL(E,c)
S ,cS ∈ R+ is such that
CREL(E
CREL(E,c)
S , cS) ∈WP(E
CREL(E,c)
S ).
Since CRELS(E, c) ∈ ECREL(E,c)S , we have CRELS(E, c) ≤ CRELS(E
CREL(E,c)
S , cS). Since
E is nonleveled and (
CREL(E
CREL(E,c)
S , cS),CRELN\S(E, c)
)
∈ E,
this means that CRELS(E, c) = CREL(E
CREL(E,c)
S , cS). Hence, the constrained relative
equal losses rule satisfies restricted consistency.
Converting subproblems induced by leaving claimants into new bankruptcy problems for
the remaining claimants tends to lose characteristics of the original bankruptcy problems.
Instead, one could also interpret the induced subproblem as the original bankruptcy problem
where the payoffs of the leaving claimants are fixed. In a sense, the original bankruptcy
problem is only reduced to a problem for the remaining claimants where the leaving claimants
leave a footprint behind. To formalize this approach, we need to redefine bankruptcy rules
on the domain of reduced bankruptcy problems.
A reduced bankruptcy problem is a quintuple (N,E, c, x, S) where (E, c) ∈ BRN , x ∈ RN+
and S ∈ 2N \ {∅} are such that (ExS , cS) ∈ BR
S . Let RBRN denote the class of all reduced
bankruptcy problems with claimant setN . For convenience, a reduced bankruptcy problem is
denoted by (E, c, x, S) ∈ RBRN and (E, c, x,N) ∈ RBRN is abbreviated to (E, c) ∈ RBRN .
A bankruptcy rule f on RBRN assigns to any reduced bankruptcy problem (E, c, x, S) ∈
RBRN a payoff allocation f(E, c, x, S) ∈WP(E) for which
fS(E, c, x, S) ≤ cS and fN\S(E, c, x, S) = xN\S .
Note that (E, c, f(E, c), S) ∈ RBRN for any bankruptcy rule f on BRN , any (E, c) ∈ BRN ,
and any S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
The proportional rule Prop on RBRN assigns to any (E, c, x, S) ∈ RBRN the payoff
allocation for which
PropS(E, c, x, S) = λ
E,c,x,ScS ,
where λE,c,x,S ∈ [0, 1] is such that Prop(E, c, x, S) ∈WP(E).
The constrained relative equal awards rule CREA on RBRN assigns to any (E, c, x, S) ∈
RBRN the payoff allocation for which





where αE,c,x,S ∈ [0, 1] is such that CREA(E, c, x, S) ∈WP(E).
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The constrained relative equal losses rule CREL on RBRN assigns to any (E, c, x, S) ∈
RBRN with E 6= {0N} the payoff allocation for which
CRELS(E, c, x, S) =
(
max{0, ci − βE,c,x,SuEi }
)
i∈S ,
where βE,c,x,S ∈ R+ is such that CREL(E, c, x, S) ∈WP(E).
We now introduce the footprint consistency property to describe bankruptcy rules which
prescribe the same payoff allocation for the original bankruptcy problem as for any reduced
bankruptcy problem in which the leaving claimants fix their allocated payoffs.
Definition 3.6 (Footprint Consistency).
A bankruptcy rule f on RBRN satisfies footprint consistency if f(E, c) = f(E, c, f(E, c), S)
for all (E, c) ∈ BRN and any S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Inspired by Young (1987), we introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy rules where
the payoff allocated to a claimant only depends on its individual characteristics within the
bankruptcy problem and a common parameter. It turns out that all parametric bankruptcy
rules satisfy footprint consistency. Specific examples of parametric bankruptcy rules are the
proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative
equal losses rule.
Definition 3.7 (Parametric Bankruptcy Rule).
A bankruptcy rule f on RBRN is parametric if there exists a function rf : R3+ → R+





(E, c, x, S) ∈ RBRN and some parameter θE,c,x,S ∈ R+.
Theorem 3.7.
All parametric bankruptcy rules satisfy footprint consistency.
Proof. Let f be a parametric bankruptcy rule on RBRN , let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let S ∈








E,c,f(E,c),S) for all i ∈ S. Since rf is
monotonic in its third argument, this means that fS(E, c) ≤ fS(E, c, f(E, c), S) or fS(E, c) ≥
fS(E, c, f(E, c), S). Since E is nonleveled, this implies that f(E, c) = f(E, c, f(E, c), S).
Hence, f satisfies footprint consistency.
Corollary 3.8.
The proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative
equal losses rule satisfy footprint consistency.
4 The Relative Adjustment Principle
In this section, we introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules and study the relative
adjustment principle. The relative adjustment principle, based on the contested garment
principle for TU-bankruptcy problems (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)), first allocates the
minimal rights to the claimants. Following Curiel et al. (1987) and Estévez-Fernández et al.
(2014), the minimal right of a claimant is the maximal payoff within the estate when all
other claimants are allocated their claims.
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max{x | (x, cN\{i}) ∈ E} if (0, cN\{i}) ∈ E;
0 if (0, cN\{i}) /∈ E.
We have m(E, c) ∈ E and m(E, c) ≤ c, which means that
((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) ∈ BRN .
Moreover, we have m(E, c) ≤ f(E, c) ≤ ĉE for any bankruptcy rule f on BRN .
Example 3.
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in which E = {x ∈ RN+ |
x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1. We have m(E, c) = (0, 13 12 ).
E
c








The following lemma derives some elementary relations between truncated claims and
minimal rights.
Lemma 4.1.
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then
(i) ̂̂cEE = ĉE;
(ii) m((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) = 0N ;
(iii) m(E, ĉE) = m(E, c);
(iv)
∧
c−m(E, c)(E−{m(E,c)})+ = ĉE −m(E, c).
Proof. (i) Let i ∈ N . We can write
̂̂cEEi = min{ĉEi , uEi } = min{min{ci, uEi }, uEi } = min{ci, uEi } = ĉEi .
(ii) Suppose that there exists an i ∈ N for which mi((E−{m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) > 0.
Then, we have(
mi((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)), (c−m(E, c))N\{i}
)
∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+.
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This means that(
mi((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) +mi(E, c), cN\{i}
)
∈ E.
This contradicts the definition of mi(E, c).
(iii) Let i ∈ N . If ĉEN\{i} = cN\{i}, we have mi(E, ĉ
E) = mi(E, c) by definition. If
ĉEN\{i} 6= cN\{i}, then (0, cN\{i}) /∈ E, so mi(E, ĉ
E) = 0 = mi(E, c).




i −mi(E, c) and
we can write
∧
(c−m(E, c))(E−{m(E,c)})+i = min
{
ci −mi(E, c), u(E−{m(E,c)})+i
}
= min{ci −mi(E, c), uEi −mi(E, c)}
= min{ci, uEi } −mi(E, c)
= ĉEi −mi(E, c).
Suppose that there exists a j ∈ N \ {i} for which mj(E, c) > 0. Then, we have ĉEi = ci
and (mj(E, c), cN\{j}) ∈ E. Since E is comprehensive and m(E, c) ≤ c, this means that
(ci,mN\{i}(E, c)) ∈ E, so (ci − mi(E, c), 0N\{i}) ∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+. This implies that
u
(E−{m(E,c)})+
i ≥ ci −mi(E, c). We can write
∧
(c−m(E, c))(E−{m(E,c)})+i = min
{
ci −mi(E, c), u(E−{m(E,c)})+i
}
= ci −mi(E, c)
= ĉEi −mi(E, c).
A bankruptcy rule satisfies minimal rights first if it assigns to the remaining bankruptcy
problem when all claimants are first allocated their minimal rights the same payoff allocation
as to the original bankruptcy problem.
Definition 4.1 (Minimal Rights First).
A bankruptcy rule f on BRN satisfies minimal rights first if
f(E, c) = m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
The proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained
relative equal losses rule do not satisfy minimal rights first. Since the constrained relative
equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal losses rule are dual bankruptcy rules
(cf. Dietzenbacher et al. (2016)), and the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies
truncation invariance, this means that minimal rights first and truncation invariance are not
dual properties, in contrast to the TU-bankruptcy context (cf. Herrero and Villar (2001)).
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Let F denote the space of all bankruptcy rules f on BRN . Inspired by Thomson and
Yeh (2008), we introduce two operators on the space of bankruptcy rules. The truncation
operator T : F → F assigns to any bankruptcy rule f ∈ F the bankruptcy rule T (f) ∈ F
which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
T (f)(E, c) = f(E, ĉE).
The minimal rights operator M : F → F assigns to any bankruptcy rule f ∈ F the
bankruptcy rule M(f) ∈ F which assigns to any (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff allocation
M(f)(E, c) = m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)).
Note that both operators are well-defined. We have f = T (f) if and only if f ∈ F satisfies
truncation invariance, and f = M(f) if and only if f ∈ F satisfies minimal rights first. In
particular, this means that CREA = T (CREA).
The next theorem studies some consequences of the truncation operator and the minimal
rights operator for the bankruptcy rules to which they are applied.
Theorem 4.2.
Let f ∈ F be a bankruptcy rule.
(i) Then, T (f) satisfies truncation invariance.
(ii) Then, M(f) satisfies minimal rights first.
(iii) If f satisfies relative symmetry, then T (f) satisfies relative symmetry.
(iv) If f satisfies truncation invariance, then M(f) satisfies truncation invariance.
(v) If f satisfies minimal rights first, then T (f) satisfies minimal rights first.
Proof. (i) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
T (f)(E, ĉE) = f(E, ̂̂cEE) = f(E, ĉE) = T (f)(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i). Hence, T (f) satisfies truncation
invariance.
(ii) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
m(E, c) +M(f)((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c))
= M(f)(E, c),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(ii). Hence, M(f) satisfies minimal rights
first.





i . Then, we can write
ĉEi u
E
j = min{ci, uEi }uEj = min{ciuEj , uEi uEj } = min{cjuEi , uEj uEi } = min{cj , uEj }uEi = ĉEj uEi .
Since f satisfies relative symmetry, this means that
T (f)i(E, c)uEj = fi(E, ĉE)uEj = fj(E, ĉE)uEi = T (f)j(E, c)uEi .
Hence, T (f) satisfies relative symmetry.
12
(iv) Assume that f satisfies truncation invariance. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
M(f)(E, ĉE) = m(E, ĉE) + f((E − {m(E, ĉE)})+, ĉE −m(E, ĉE))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+,
∧
c−m(E, c)(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c))
=M(f)(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(iii), the third equality follows from
Lemma 4.1(iv), and the fourth equality follows from f satisfying truncation invariance.
Hence, M(f) satisfies truncation invariance.
(v) Assume that f satisfies minimal rights first. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
m(E, c) + T (f)((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+,
∧
c−m(E, c)(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c))
= m(E, ĉE) + f((E − {m(E, ĉE)})+, ĉE −m(E, ĉE))
= f(E, ĉE)
= T (f)(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(iv), the third equality follows from Lemma
4.1(iii), and the fourth equality follows from f satisfying minimal rights first. Hence, T (f)
satisfies minimal rights first.
The purpose of Theorem 4.2 is twofold. First, it shows that the truncation operator and
the minimal rights operator ‘force’ bankruptcy rules to satisfy truncation invariance and
minimal rights first, respectively. Second, it studies the preservation of properties under the
truncation operator and the minimal rights operator. Both operators preserve truncation
invariance and minimal rights first. Relative symmetry is preserved under the truncation




Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in which E = {x ∈ RN+ |
x21+2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (5, 15). We have m(E, c) = (
√
5, 5 12 ). Let f ∈ {Prop,CREA,CREL}.
Since f satisfies relative symmetry, we have f(E, c) = (3
√
5 − 3, 9
√
5 − 9). However,
M(f)(E, c) 6= f(E, c), which means that M(f) does not satisfy relative symmetry.
E
c










What happens if we apply the operators multiple times? Let f ∈ F . From Theorem
4.2, we know that T (f) satisfies truncation invariance and M(f) satisfies minimal rights
first, which means that T (T (f)) = T (f) and M(M(f)) = M(f). By the preservation of
properties, we know that T (M(f)) and M(T (f)) both satisfy truncation invariance and
minimal rights first, which means that T (M(T (f))) = T (M(M(f))) = T (M(f)) and
M(T (T (f))) =M(T (M(f))) =M(T (f)). Hence, nothing extra happens when one of the
operators is applied more than once. However, the two operators can be combined to obtain
a bankruptcy rule which satisfies both truncation invariance and minimal rights first. As the
following proposition shows, the order in which the operators are applied does not matter.
Proposition 4.3.
Let f ∈ F . Then T (M(f)) =M(T (f)).
Proof. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . We can write
T (M(f))(E, c) =M(f)(E, ĉE)
= m(E, ĉE) + f((E − {m(E, ĉE)})+, ĉE −m(E, ĉE))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c))
= m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+,
∧
c−m(E, c)(E−{m(E,c)})+)
= m(E, c) + T (f)((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c))
=M(T (f))(E, c),
where the third equality follows from Lemma 4.1(iii) and the fourth equality follows from
Lemma 4.1(iv).
The bankruptcy rule T (M(f)) is called the adjusted counterpart of the rule f ∈ F .
Three examples of adjusted bankruptcy rules are given by the adjusted proportional rule2
T (M(Prop)), the adjusted constrained relative equal awards rule T (M(CREA)), and the
adjusted constrained relative equal losses rule T (M(CREL)).
2The adjusted proportional rule for TU-bankruptcy problems was introduced by Curiel et al. (1987).
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The adjusted counterpart of every bankruptcy rule satisfies truncation invariance and
minimal rights first. On the class of bankruptcy problems with two claimants, all adjusted
counterparts of bankruptcy rules which satisfy relative symmetry coincide. This standard
solution for two-claimant bankruptcy problems is called the relative adjustment principle.3
Definition 4.2 (Relative Adjustment Principle).
A bankruptcy rule f ∈ F satisfies the relative adjustment principle if




for all (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2, where t ∈ [0, 1] is such that f(E, c) ∈WP(E).
Example 5.
Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN in which E = {x ∈ RN+ |
x21 + 2x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 24) as in Example 1 and Example 3. We have ĉE = (3, 18) and








5 + 11 14 ) for any bankruptcy
rule f ∈ F satisfying the relative adjustment principle.
E
c









In order to axiomatically characterize the relative adjustment principle, we introduce the
class of simple bankruptcy problems.
Definition 4.3 (Simple Bankruptcy Problem).
A bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN is called simple if ĉE = c and m(E, c) = 0N .
Let SBRN denote the class of all simple bankruptcy problems with claimant set N .
Lemma 4.4.
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then ((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c)) ∈ SBRN .
Proof. We can write
∧




= ̂̂cEE −m(E, ĉE)
= ĉE −m(E, c),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(iii), the second equality follows from Lemma
4.1(iv), and the third equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i) and Lemma 4.1(iii).
3For TU-bankruptcy problems, Aumann and Maschler (1985) called this standard solution the contested
garment principle. Later, Thomson (2003) named it the concede-and-divide principle.
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Moreover, we can write
m((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c)) = m((E − {m(E, ĉE)})+, ĉE −m(E, ĉE)) = 0N ,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(iii) and the second equality follows from
Lemma 4.1(ii).
A bankruptcy rule satisfies the simple counterpart of a property if it satisfies that property
on the class of simple bankruptcy problems. For example, a bankruptcy rule f ∈ F satisfies
simple relative symmetry if fi(E, c)u
E
j = fj(E, c)u
E
i for all (E, c) ∈ SBR





i . Note that all bankruptcy rules satisfy simple truncation invariance
and simple minimal rights first. If a bankruptcy rule satisfies a property, then Lemma 4.4
implies that its adjusted counterpart satisfies the simple counterpart of that property, e.g.,
the adjusted counterpart of any relative symmetric bankruptcy rule satisfies simple relative
symmetry. Inspired by Dagan (1996), we provide the following axiomatic characterization of
the relative adjustment principle based on simple relative symmetry, truncation invariance,
and minimal rights first. In particular, this means that the adjusted counterpart of any
relative symmetric bankruptcy rule satisfies the relative adjustment principle.
Theorem 4.5.
A bankruptcy rule satisfies the relative adjustment principle if, and only if, it satisfies simple
relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and minimal rights first on the class of bankruptcy
problems with two claimants.
Proof. Let f ∈ F be a bankruptcy rule satisfying the relative adjustment principle. Let


























Hence, f satisfies simple relative symmetry.
Now, let (E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2. We can write
f(E, ĉE) = m(E, ĉE) + t
(̂̂cEE −m(E, ĉE)) = m(E, c) + t (ĉE −m(E, c)) = f(E, c),
where the second equality follows from Lemma 4.1(i) and Lemma 4.1(iii). Hence, f satisfies
truncation invariance. Moreover, we can write
m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, c−m(E, c)) = m(E, c) + t
∧c−m(E, c)(E−{m(E,c)})+






where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.1(ii) and the second equality follows from
Lemma 4.1(iv). Hence, f satisfies minimal rights first.
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Let f ∈ F be a bankruptcy rule satisfying simple relative symmetry, truncation invari-
ance, and minimal rights first on the class of bankruptcy problems with two claimants. Let
(E, c) ∈ BRN with |N | = 2. Since f satisfies truncation invariance and minimal rights first,
we have f(E, c) = m(E, c) + f((E − {m(E, c)})+, ĉE −m(E, c)). We know from Lemma 4.4
that ((E−{m(E, c)})+, ĉE−m(E, c)) ∈ SBRN . Let i ∈ N and let j ∈ N \{i}. We can write
u
(E−{m(E,c)})+
i = max{xi | x ∈ (E − {m(E, c)})+}
= max{xi | (xi +mi(E, c),mN\{i}(E, c)) ∈ E}
=
{
uEi −mi(E, c) if mN\{i}(E, c) = 0;
ci −mi(E, c) if mN\{i}(E, c) > 0
=
{
uEi −mi(E, c) if ĉEi = uEi ;
ci −mi(E, c) if ĉEi = ci













Since f satisfies simple relative symmetry, this implies that




for some t ∈ [0, 1]. We can write





Hence, f satisfies the relative adjustment principle.
Corollary 4.6.
The adjusted proportional rule, the adjusted constrained relative equal awards rule, and the
adjusted constrained relative equal losses rule satisfy the relative adjustment principle.
Future research could study generalizations of other bankruptcy rules which satisfy the
relative adjustment principle on the class of TU-bankruptcy problems, such as the random
arrival rule (cf. O’Neill (1982)), the minimal overlap rule (cf. O’Neill (1982)), and the
Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)).
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